Bingham Consolidation Company, a Delaware corporation v. Robert Groesbeck, an individual; Marilyn Groesbeck Glade, an individual; and Robert Groesbeck and R. Clay Groesbeck as Trustees of the Robert R. Groesbeck Living Trust, a Utah Trust : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
Bingham Consolidation Company, a Delaware
corporation v. Robert Groesbeck, an individual;
Marilyn Groesbeck Glade, an individual; and
Robert Groesbeck and R. Clay Groesbeck as
Trustees of the Robert R. Groesbeck Living Trust, a
Utah Trust : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert S. Clark; Daniel E. Barnett; Parr, Waddopus, Brown, Gee & Loveless; Attorneys for
Appellees.
John B. Wilson; Parsons Behle & Latimer; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Bingham Consolidation Company v. Groesbeck, No. 20040141 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4810
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BINGHAM CONSOLIDATION 
COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
ROBERT GROESBECK, an individual; 
MARILYN GROESBECK GLADE, an 
individual; and ROBERT GROESBECK 
AND R. CLAY GROESBECK as 
Trustees of the ROBERT R. 
GROESBECK LIVING TRUST, 
a Utah Trust, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
ROBERT S. CLARK (4015) 
DANIEL E. BARNETT (8579) 
PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN, GEE & 
LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Appellees 
185 South State, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Facsimile: (801) 532-7750 
Appeal No. 20040141-CA 
District Court Case No. 980904874 
JOHN B.WILSON (3511) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Appellant 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
AUG 302004 
REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Judge Stephen Henriod 
604925 1 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BINGHAM CONSOLIDATION 
COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
Va. 
ROBERT GROESBECK, an individual; 
MARILYN GROESBECK GLADE, an 
individual; and ROBERT GROESBECK 
AND R. CLAY GROESBECK as 
Trustees of the ROBERT R. 
GROESBECK LIVING TRUST, 
a Utah Trust, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Appeal No. 20040141-CA 
District Court Case No. 980904874 
REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Judge Stephen Henriod 
ROBERT S. CLARK (4015) 
DANIEL E. BARNETT (8579) 
PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN, GEE & 
LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Appellees 
185 South State, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Facsimile: (801) 532-7750 
JOHN B.WILSON (3511) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Appellant 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
604925.1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
I. REPLY TO STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
II. REPLY TO STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
III. GROESBECKS' ARGUMENT FAILS TO RECONCILE KENNECOTT'S 
RIGHTS UNDER THE MINING LEASE WITH THE COURT'S 
EVALUATION 4 
IV. THE COURT DID NOT FOLLOW AN APPROVED METHODOLOGY 
FOR THE APPRAISAL OF NEW BINGHAM SHARES 5 
V. GROESBECKS CONCEDE THAT SPECULATION IS NOT A PROPER 
BASIS FOR DETERMINATION OF FAIR VALUE 13 
VI. THE COURT IMPROPERLY ANALYZED EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE TO 
INTERPRET THE LEASE 15 
VII. GROESBECKS FAIL TO RESPOND TO SIGNIFICANT EVIDENCE 
CONCERNING THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF POTENTIAL LEGAL 
CLAIMS 17 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 18 
604925.1 i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
STATE CASES 
In re Adoption of Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988) 1 
Bench v. Bechtel Civil Minerals, Inc., 758 P.2d460 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988) 1 
Fleming v. International Pizza Supply Corp., 676N.E.2d 1051 (Ind. 1997) 10 
Hogle v. Zinetics Medical, Inc., 63 P.3d 80 (Utah 2002) 1, 6, 12 
Oakridge Energy, Inc., v. Clifton, 937 P.2d 130 (Utah 1997) 6 
Oliphant v. Estate ofBrunetti, 64 P.3d 587 (Ut. Ct. App. 2002) 2 
Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA, 48 P.3d941 (Utah 2002) 16 
Steinberg v. Amplica, Inc., 729 P.2d683 (Cal. 1986) 9 
Sturgeon Petroleums, Ltd. v. Merchants Petroleum Co., 147 Cal. App. 3d 134, 
195 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1983) 9 
Walter J. Schloss Associate v. Arkwin Ind., Inc., 455 N.Y.S.2d 844 (N.Y. App. 
1982) 8,9 
Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Association, 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995) 15, 16 
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d701 (Del. 1983) 11, 12 
Yeargin v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission, 20 P.3d 287 
(Utah 2001) 15 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1330(l) 5 
L REPLY TO STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
An overriding issue in this litigation is whether the trial court improperly based its 
evaluation of New Bingham Mary Mining Company ("New Bingham") shares on what 
might have happened to the company but for actions of the company's management in 
alleged violation of its duties to the minority shareholders. This Court owes no deference 
to the trial court on that issue. As the Utah Supreme Court said in Hogle v. Zinetics 
Medical Inc., 63 P.3d 80, 84 (Utah 2002), m[W]hile the ultimate determination of fair 
value is a question of fact, the determination of whether a given fact or circumstance is 
relevant to fair value under [state law] is a question of law which we review de novo*" 
(Citations omitted.) 
Groesbecks argue frequently for deference to the trial court because of its 
opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. In this litigation there were actually 
very few eyewitnesses with memories of the pertinent events because those events 
occurred so many years ago. Many of the court's factual determinations were based on 
documentary evidence. To the extent that the trial court's findings were based on 
documentary evidence this Court has recognized that it is "in as good a position as the 
trial court to examine the evidence de novo and determine the facts." In re Adoption of 
Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916, 918 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988); see also, Bench v. Bechtel 
Civil Minerals, Inc., 758 P.2d 460, 461 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988). 
Although Groesbecks discuss various standards of review surrounding the 
interpretation of the 1979 Mining Lease ("the Lease"), they do not provide the standard 
for review of a finding in the first instance that a contract is ambiguous. This Court has 
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previously held that whether a written document is ambiguous is a question of law, 
reviewed for correctness. Oliphant v. Estate of Brunetti, 64 P.3d 587, 591 (Ut Ct. App. 
2002). 
II. REPLY TO STATEMENT OF FACTS, 
In their statement of facts at pages 6-7, Groesbecks describe the process of open 
pit mining. Appellant has previously done the same and will not repeat that here. One 
aspect of Groesbecks' description, however, merits a response. Groesbecks describe 
"stripping" as a process of removing waste with no ore material therein, to provide access 
to ore contained in properties located closer to the center of the open pit mine. Brief of 
Appellees, p. 6. The description in the abstract is fine, but is misleadmg if construed to 
apply to the facts of this case. The Bingham open pit mine contains two types of ore, 
skam ore located deep underground, and disseminated porphyry ore generally spread 
throughout the property. R. 1192, pp. 83-84. Kennecott did in fact mine disseminated 
ore from the New Bingham claims and New Bingham was credited with royalties for that 
ore pursuant to the Lease. Ex. 23. In addition, the appraisals of both parties' experts 
credited New Bingham with revenues for disseminated ore scheduled to be mined in the 
future. In the years when no ore was encountered or anticipated to be encountered, New 
Bingham was credited with the $25,000 annual advance royalty payment called for by the 
Lease. Further, under the investment value portion of Groesbecks' appraisal, 
Groesbecks' experts included in their $3.50 per share valuation the quantity of deep skarn 
ore believed to exist on the New Bingham claims. In order to reach that ore either the 
surface of the New Bingham claims would have to be removed, or an underground mine, 
which does not currently exist, would have to be constructed by Kennecott to reach it. 
Under the former scenario, removal of the surface of the New Bingham claims not only 
serves to recover disseminated porphyry ore on those claims, but also could provide 
access to the deep skarn ore which Groesbecks have included in their value calculation. 
For these reasons it is not accurate to suggest that Kennecott's activities on the New 
Bingham claims benefited only Kennecott. 
Groesbecks in their brief criticize appellant's appraiser for his reliance on 
information provided by Kennecott. Their criticism ignores the fact that appellant's 
appraisal was based entirely on the present value of royalties anticipated from future 
mining, from which were deducted certain costs, all of which can only come from 
Kennecott. Groesbecks5 experts relied on the very same information for the very same 
reasons in preparing the investment value portion of their two-part appraisal. The parties' 
experts disagreed in their investment value appraisal primarily on the basis of metal 
prices and discount rate, two variables on which reasonable minds can differ. In the final 
analysis, the only real difference between the two appraisals is Groesbecks' addition of a 
tenfold increase in value to account for "stripping rights." 
Groesbecks make reference at page 8 of their brief to potential agreements 
apparently discussed but never consummated (one of them 30 years prior to the trial!) by 
which New Bingham would have granted Kennecott stripping rights on New Bingham 
property. Those references are red herrings. At the time of those discussions New 
Bingham had no means by which to earn income from its claims. An agreement like 
those proposed would have provided New Bingham an opportunity for income. Those 
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circumstances changed in 1979 when Newr Bingham conveyed by lease to Anaconda the 
right to enter on and mine its property, and to engage in related operations. No separate 
"stripping rights" agreement was ever signed. Although Groesbecks deride the Lease as 
a "sweetheart deal" (Brief of Appellees, p. 18), once they lost their fight to oppose the 
Lease, they twice accepted dividends funded by royalties paid pursuant to the Lease. R. 
1124. 
III. GROESBECKS' ARGUMENT FAILS TO RECONCILE KENNECOTT'S 
RIGHTS UNDER THE MINING LEASE WITH THE COURT'S 
EVALUATION. 
In its opening brief appellant discussed at some length the inconsistency inherent 
in the court's ruling, which recognized Kennecott's right to mine the surface of the New 
Bingham claims, but not if it meant expanding the Kennecott pit. Groesbecks failed to 
respond to the argument or to reconcile the inconsistency. 
The trial court ruled in its Memorandum Decision "that the Lease and assignment 
thereof included stripping rights . . . ." R. 1138. Stripping is nothing more than the 
removal of the surface of the earth. Sometimes the material removed contains enough 
mineral to be characterized as ore. Sometimes it does not, and it is characterized as 
waste. Some of the material removed from the New Bingham claims by Kennecott was 
waste. Some of it was ore for which New Bingham was paid royalties. It is obviously 
not possible to remove the surface of the ground without the pit getting larger. As the pit 
gets larger, more ore is exposed. Some of the ore was Kennecott's ore. Some of the ore 
was New Bingham's ore. It was not possible for Kennecott to exercise the rights granted 
by the Lease to mine the surface of the New Bingham property without at the same time 
A 
exposing more of Kennecott's own ore. That being the case, there is no factual or legal 
basis for the trial court's apparent distinction between removal of the surface for the 
purpose of mining, or for the purpose of expanding the pit to access other ore, because 
the two occur simultaneously, as they necessarily must. 
IV. THE COURT DID NOT FOLLOW AN APPROVED METHODOLOGY 
FOR THE APPRAISAL OF NEW BINGHAM SHARES. 
Both parties acknowledge that to determine fair value under Utah Code Ann. §16-
10a-1330(1) courts consider asset value, market value, and investment value. In its 
appraisal plaintiff employed investment value methodology to determine the present 
value of New Bingham's only income, the stream of revenues paid under the Lease, and 
to arrive at a value of $ 1.10 per share. 
Groesbecks are unable to articulate the methodology they employed. If it is the 
investment value methodology, then their calculated value of the New Bingham shares 
was $3.50 per share. That is the value Groesbecks' experts placed on the mining lease 
revenue using exactly the same investment value methodology and data from the 
Kennecott mining department that appellant used, differing from the analysis conducted 
by appellant primarily in the fact that different metal prices and a different discount rate 
were used. Ex. 126. That methodology conforms to the requirements of law. If it had 
been the basis for the evaluation of the New Bingham shares, the methodology would not 
have been objectionable. 
Groesbecks then went on, however, to argue that additional value should be added 
because of the impact of past management decisions, years before the merger and 
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unrelated to it, in alleged violation of management's fiduciary duties. The addition of 
this latter component of value cannot in any way be considered part of the investment 
value methodology. The parameters of the investment value methodology are clear and 
unambiguous. The investment value approach estimates the corporation's future earning 
capacity. Oakridge Energy, Inc., v. Clifton. 937 P.2d 130, 133 (Utah 1997). The 
investment value method consists of two steps. Id. First, recent earnings history is used 
to establish an average annual earnings figure. Id. Second, a capitalization ratio or 
earnings multiplier is chosen. Id. Investment value equals the product of the 
capitalization ratio and the average earnings figure. Id. There is no place for breach of 
fiduciary duty claims in the investment value formula. 
Similarly, the breach of fiduciary duty claims cannot fit within the confines of the 
asset value methodology. The asset value methodology is appropriate when a company is 
undergoing liquidation such that asset value can reasonably be measured. Hogle v. 
Zinetics Medical Inc., 63 P.3d 80, 86 (Utah 2002). The Hogle court noted that absent 
actual liquidation a company must be valued as a going concern. Id. There was no 
liquidation process occurring in the instant action and thus asset value is not an 
appropriate valuation methodology for the Groesbecks' shares. 
Nonetheless, Groesbecks appear to suggest that they are simultaneously also 
employing the asset value methodology when they argue at page 21 of their brief that 
New Bingham's assets at the time of the merger included claims for breaches of fiduciary 
duty or, alternatively, the mining claims unencumbered by the Lease. Groesbecks further 
contend that the trial court was entitled to follow such an approach because of case law 
holding that "where the fair value of shares is affected by claims for breach of fiduciary 
duty, those claims can and must be considered in an appraisal proceeding." Brief of 
Appellees, p. 21. 
Leaving aside for the moment the inherent inconsistency in awarding $3.50 per 
share for the present value of the lease revenues, and additionally awarding value for the 
claims unencumbered by the Lease, Groesbecks' approach neither comports with reality 
nor is it supported by the case law they cite. 
There is no evidence and no finding that New Bingham ever recognized as an 
asset a legal cause of action. Such a shareholder derivative claim was never raised at any 
time during the life of the corporation. There is no expert or other testimony purporting 
to evaluate the merits and value of such a potential legal cause of action. Rather, the only 
other evaluation evidence was the value of ore that Kennecott would have access to by 
virtue of mining on the New Bingham claims, to which a royalty or purchase price 
percentage was applied. 
With regard to Groesbecks5 alternative characterization, the reality is that the 
claims were encumbered by the Lease as of the day immediately prior to the merger. 
Contrary to Groesbecks' representation (Brief of Appellees, p. 19) the court did not rule 
that the Lease was void. See R. 1141, Tflf 25, 57. Although Groesbecks argue that the 
Lease could have or should have been terminated, it was not. Although in the course of 
this sizeable transaction, Kennecott and Anaconda initially overlooked the assignment 
and consent provisions, those documents were eventually obtained and the Lease was 
never terminated by New Bingham management for reasons appellant explained in its 
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opening brief. 
Groesbecks justify their unorthodox approach based upon cases discussed at pages 
21 through 24 of their brief. In none of those cases did the court conclude that a cause of 
action unasserted at the time of the merger was an asset to be included in the appraisal. 
Rather, in those cases where the court looked into the management of the corporation, it 
was always prompted to do so by allegations that management's activities in question 
were done in anticipation of the merger with the intent of depressing the stock price to be 
paid in the merger. In none of those cases did the court review management actions 
unrelated to the merger for decisions that impacted the value of the company. 
In discussing the New York case of Walter J. Schloss Assoc, v. Arkwin Ind., Inc., 
455 N.Y.S.2d 844 (N.Y. App. 1982), the Groesbecks quote the dissenting opinion 
(dissenting opinion adopted on certiorari review by Court of Appeals, 460 N.E.2d 1090 
(N.Y. 1984)) in support of their argument for inclusion of breach of fiduciary duty 
allegations in appraisal proceedings: 
An action for damages alone will not lie, since this would 
allow a dissenting shareholder, by merely alleging fraudulent 
or unlawful corporate conduct, to seek therein the identical 
relief available to him in appraisal proceedings. For example, 
where, as here, there is "a forced liquidation or sale of the 
minority shareholder's stock incident to a merger," the full 
and proper monetary recovery of the fair value of dissenters' 
shares may be obtained in appraisal proceedings in which the 
discharge of the majority's fiduciary duty to the minority can 
be weighed in determining fair value. 
Id. at 851-52 (emphasis added). The key language used by the Schloss court is "incident 
to a merger." The defendant majority stockholder in Schloss deliberately refrained from 
Q 
declaring any dividends in 1979 after a run up in sales and profits. Id. at 845. The 
merger at issue occurred immediately thereafter in 1980. Id. The failure to declare a 
dividend in 1979, which depressed the share price, subsequently negatively impacted the 
minority shareholders when the merger occurred in 1980. The breach of fiduciary duty 
was "incident to the merger." 
The Groesbecks next cite to the California case of Steinberg v. Amplica, Inc., 729 
P.2d 683 (Cal. 1986). In discussing the appraisal proceeding process, the Steinberg court 
looked to the Sturgeon case. See Sturgeon Petroleums, Ltd. v. Merchants Petroleum Co., 
147 Cal.App.3d 134, 195 Cal. Rptr 29 (1983). In discussing Sturgeon, the court 
described the holding in Sturgeon that "a shareholder may litigate his claim of 
misconduct in an appraisal proceeding, and to the extent he is able to prove that the value 
of the shares was diminished by misconduct in connection with the merger, his 
recovery could be adjusted in that proceeding." Id. at 690 (quoting Sturgeon at 147 Cal. 
App. 3d 134, 141, 195 Cal. Rptr. 29) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the Steinberg 
court's holding was: 
We conclude that at least in a case such as this, where the 
plaintiff was aware of all the facts leading to his cause of 
action for alleged misconduct in connection with the term of 
the merger prior to the time the merger was consummated 
but deliberately opted to sue for damage instead of seeking an 
appraisal, section 1312(a) [California Corporations Code] acts 
as a bar. 
Id. at 694. (emphasis added). Similar to the language in Schloss above, the key language 
in Steinberg is "in connection with the term of the merger." 
The Groesbecks go on to claim that the Indiana Supreme Court requires a minority 
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shareholder to "present claims for breach of fiduciary duty in a statutory appraisal 
proceeding." (Brief of Appellees, p. 22.) The Groesbecks' analysis of Indiana law is 
flawed. See Fleming v. Int'l Pizza Supply Corp., 676 N.E.2d 1051 (Ind. 1997). The 
court's language in Fleming is clear: 
[W]e think the defendants are correct in their argument that, 
in a merger or asset sale, the exclusive remedy available to a 
shareholder seeking payment for the value of the 
shareholder's shares is the statutory appraisal procedure. We 
believe the legislature clearly and unambiguously made the 
determination that separate actions would not lie for breach of 
fiduciary duty and fraud.... 
Id. at 1056-57. The court further explained its rationale for the aforementioned quote in 
footnote no. 9 by stating: 
We believe that it is equally clear that the BCL [Indiana 
Business Corporation Law] did not intend to restrict any 
claims of wrongdoing that a corporation or shareholder brings 
before the corporate action creating dissenters' rights occurs. 
For example, if an officer had stolen money from the 
corporation prior to a merger, the corporation (or a 
shareholder on the corporation's behalf) would have a claim 
(or a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation) to recover 
the money from the officer. If such a claim is not yet 
resolved at the time the fair value of the dissenters' shares is 
established, the corporation's claim should be valued like any 
other asset of the corporation. 
Id at 57, The court's explanation in footnote 9 delineates a fiduciary duty claim 
rightfully brought as a derivative suit, as opposed to inclusion in a statutory appraisal 
procedure, unless the breach of fiduciary duty claim is pending and remains unresolved at 
the time of the valuation of the dissenter's shares. Moreover, as discussed in footnote 1 
of appellants' opening brief, the breach of fiduciary duty claims in Fleming occurred in 
i n 
the same year as the appraisal proceeding. In the instant action, no breach of fiduciary 
duty claim "remained unresolved" because none had ever been brought in the first place. 
Simply put, there was no breach of fiduciary duty claim outstanding that could be valued 
as an asset. 
In discussing Delaware law, the Groesbecks again allege that breach of fiduciary 
duty claims are allowed in a statutory appraisal proceeding. Brief of Appellees, p. 23. 
To the contrary, Delaware law stands for the proposition that breach of fiduciary duty 
claims are not properly raised in the statutory appraisal proceeding unless they have some 
relation to the merger. In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), material 
information which was directly related to the merger in question was withheld from 
minority shareholders such that the minority shareholder vote was not an informed one, 
amounting to what the court deemed a breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the majority 
shareholders. Id. at 703. The crux of the Weinberger case was whether or not the 
majority shareholders' failure to disclose a feasibility study (prepared in anticipation of 
the merger) to the minority shareholders amounted to "a matter of material significance" 
such that a breach of fiduciary duty occurred. Id. at 709. The court stated that "the 
limited function of the [Chancery] court was to determine whether defendants had 
disclosed all information in their possession germane to the transaction at issue [the 
merger]." Id. at 710 (emphasis added). The feasibility study was commissioned by 
directors who sat on the boards of both the acquiring and selling corporations. Id. The 
feasibility study was completed in anticipation of the merger to determine the maximum 
price that should be offered by the acquiring company. Id. By failing to provide this 
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clearly material information to the minority shareholders, a breach of fiduciary duty 
occurred directly related to the merger. 
The Groesbecks further note that the Delaware Supreme Court comments that 
during an appraisal proceeding a court should take into account "all relevant factors." 
Brief of Appellees, p. 23; Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713. Significantly, however, the "all 
relevant factors" language is contained in the Delaware appraisal statute but is not 
contained in the Utah appraisal statute. 
Utah courts have not by implication approved of inclusion of breach of fiduciary 
duty claims in a shareholder appraisal proceeding for alleged breaches of fiduciary duty 
unrelated to a merger. In Hogle v. Zinetic Medical Inc., 63 P.3d 80, (Utah 2002), cited 
by the Groesbecks, the Utah Supreme Court looked at the behavior by the majority 
shareholder that may have suppressed the value of minority shares in anticipation of the 
merger. The Hogle court was concerned that the majority was making business decisions 
in anticipation of and in an effort to facilitate a squeeze out of the minority shareholders. 
Id. 85. '"[Insufficient evidence exists to support a conclusion that decisions made by the 
Zinetics' Board of Directors [minority] while controlled by Synectics [majority] were 
improperly made with an eye toward repressing the value of Zinetics until the minority 
shareholders could be 'squeezed out."" Id. Further, the Hogle court's discussion of the 
trial court's holding that the majority "did not suppress the value of Zinetics in 
anticipation of the merger, then there is no presumption that short-term post-merger 
gains were a result of the merger," Id. at 89 (emphasis added), suggests that Utah courts 
may look at breach of fiduciary duty evidence in an appraisal but only such evidence that 
is contemporaneous with the merger. 
The common thread in all the breach of fiduciary cases cited by the Groesbecks is 
that the breach of fiduciary duty claims occurred "in connection with the merger" or in 
"relation to the merger." The breach of fiduciary duty claims in the aforementioned cases 
all had a direct impact on the merger itself and were thus, as far as the courts were 
concerned, inextricably linked to the fair appraisal of the shares in question. In contrast, 
the Groesbecks5 alleged incidents of breach of fiduciary occurred many years ago and 
there is no rational basis to link the alleged breach of fiduciary duty to the merger of New 
Bingham Mary and Kennecott. 
V. GROESBECKS CONCEDE THAT SPECULATION IS NOT A PROPER 
BASIS FOR DETERMINATION OF FAIR VALUE. 
In part III of their brief Groesbecks characterize as "a clever slight of hand" 
appellant's argument that Kennecott never would have agreed to pay $36 million to New 
Bingham for another mining lease with New Bingham. Groesbecks go so far as to argue 
that "the probability that a particular party (Kennecott) would have entered into a 
transaction is not an element of fair value.5' Brief of Appellees, p. 39. Yet that is exactly 
the type of evidence the trial court has relied upon. The trial court determined that New 
Bingham management should have terminated the Lease and forced Kennecott to enter 
into a new lease, for which Kennecott would have paid $36 million. R. 1141, f 34. That, 
of course, never happened. Judging from the number of times the phrase "would have" 
or "should have" appears in Groesbecks5 brief, this entire portion of Groesbecks5 
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evaluation is an exercise in speculation, and reduces the appraisal process to a question of 
which party's speculation is better. Appellant agrees with Groesbecks that what the 
parties "would have" done many years ago should not be an element of fair value. 
In support of its argument that Kennecott never would have paid so much money 
to New Bingham, appellant in its opening brief referenced the 1985 sale between 
Kennecott and Anaconda in which thousands of acres of land onto which the pit could be 
expanded were sold for $5 million. The sale was an arm's length transaction between 
two knowledgeable mining companies both acting in their own self interest. The trial 
court did not consider the Anaconda sale in either its Memorandum Decision or Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Groesbecks in their brief at page 40 try to justify the 
complete disregard of that material evidence by referring to the transaction as a sale for 
"nuisance value" and showing that Anaconda sold other properties for low prices to get 
out of the mining business. But the disparity between the value placed on New Bingham 
by the court and the value placed on it by the Kennecott/Anaconda transaction is so 
extreme that it would suggest that Anaconda gave away hundreds of millions of dollars. 
For example, the court found that the value of New Bingham was approximately $36 
million. Based simply upon the aerial photo of the Kennecott pit attached at Tab 6 to 
appellant's opening brief, it appears for the sake of argument that at least 10 times more 
property than is covered by the New Bingham claims, and which was included in the 
Anaconda sale, was within the pit at the time of the merger. Employing the trial court's 
logic, all of that property is as valuable as the New Bingham property because all of it 
was used to expand the pit. If, as the court concluded, the New Bingham claims were 
worth $36 million, then just the balance of the property included in the pit in the 1997 
photo would have been worth ten times as much, or $360 million. The disparity between 
the price Anaconda accepted for everything ($5 million) and the value of the property in 
the pit in 1997 as appraised by the trial court (at least $360 million) is so extreme that it 
cannot be explained by Anaconda's desire to get out of the mining business. 
VL THE COURT IMPROPERLY ANALYZED EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE TO 
INTERPRET THE LEASE. 
Groesbecks argue that the trial court properly admitted extrinsic evidence to 
interpret the Lease. The law, however, requires that the court first determine that the 
Lease is ambiguous, which it can do with the assistance of extrinsic evidence, and only at 
that point can the court consider extrinsic evidence to interpret the lease. In the instant 
case the court, without finding that the Lease is ambiguous, and with no reference to what 
specific provisions of the Lease are ambiguous, simply moved directly to a review of 
documentary evidence outside the Lease to conclude "that the Lease and assignment 
thereof included stripping rights . . ." (R. 1137), but not for the purpose of obtaining 
access to other ore. 
Whether a contract provision is ambiguous is a matter of law. Yeargin v. Auditing 
Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n., 20 P.3d 287, 297 (Utah 2001). The Utah test for 
determining whether a contract is ambiguous is found in Ward v. Intermountain Farmers 
Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995): 
When determining whether a contract is ambiguous, any 
relevant evidence must be considered . . . . A judge should 
therefore consider any credible evidence offered to show the 
parties' intention . . . . If after considering such evidence the 
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court determines that the interpretations contended for are 
reasonably supported by the language of the contract, then 
extrinsic evidence is admissible to clarify the ambiguous 
terms . . . . Conversely, if after considering such evidence, 
the court determines that the language of the contract is not 
ambiguous, then the parties' intentions must be determined 
solely from the language of the contract. 
Id. at 268. 
In the instant action the trial court did not follow the process in Ward to determine 
whether a contract is ambiguous. The trial court did not analyze the Lease to determine 
whether certain provisions were capable of more than one reasonable interpretation as to 
uncertain terms, missing terms, or facial deficiencies. Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA, 48 
P.3d 941, 945 (Utah 2002) ("[a] contract provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more 
than one reasonable interpretation because of 'uncertain meanings of terms, missing 
terms, or other facial deficiencies.'"). Had it done so the trial court would have 
determined that the broad grant of rights "to develop, extract, take, mine, save and sell 
minerals from the Property, and to engage in related operations with respect to all veins, 
lodes and mineral deposits contained in or on the Property" (Ex. 3, emphasis added) is 
not ambiguous, particularly where Groesbecks' own expert conceded that surface mining 
rights by necessary implication include stripping rights. R. 1194, p. 344. Groesbecks' 
experts, significantly, rendered no opinion about the Lease. Groesbecks' argument now, 
that language they wish had appeared in the Lease is in fact absent, does not make the 
Lease ambiguous. 
VII. GROESBECKS FAIL TO RESPOND TO SIGNIFICANT EVIDENCE 
CONCERNING THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF POTENTIAL LEGAL 
CLAIMS. 
In their response to appellant's argument concerning Groesbecks' substantial 
knowledge of facts which might give rise to legal causes of action against the 
management of the corporation, Groesbecks fail to respond to significant evidence of 
their knowledge and also to respond to appellant's argument that they were at the very 
least on inquiry notice of their claims. 
The most glaring omission, and an event which the court failed to consider in its 
Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, is the 1986 
shareholder meeting. At that meeting the Groesbecks and their legal counsel were 
introduced to the new management of New Bingham, who were also employees of 
Kennecott. Notes of the meeting (Ex. 12) reflect that there was a discussion of the sale 
by Anaconda to Kennecott. Most significantly, the notes reflect that the management 
advised shareholders that Kennecott "intended to mine across the claims for waste 
removal and construction of roads." It is hard to imagine how notice of Kennecott's 
intention to strip the waste from the New Bingham claims could more clearly have been 
conveyed. Groesbecks also fail to address the information given to them by Kennecott at 
their request during 1987. Among the information given to Groesbecks and their legal 
counsel at meetings and in documents was a location map. Ex. 17. Instead, Groesbecks 
can only point to a statement in the 1992 shareholder meeting minutes, made in response 
to a question asked by another shareholder, about where the property is located, 
indicating that "it is in the Oquirrh Mountains above and around the open pit." Ex. 22. 
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Groesbecks ignore the fact that in the very next sentence of the minutes another 
shareholder asked if a topical map was available and management responded that "one 
was available and would be sent to all stockholders requesting it." 
Groesbecks do not respond in their brief to authority offered by appellant that at 
the very least such information was sufficient to put them on inquiry notice of their 
claims, and that once on inquiry notice they were required to exercise due diligence to 
inquire into the situation. Groesbecks' failure to do so means the statute of limitations 
was not tolled and the court erred in concluding that their claims were not time barred. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the reasons articulated above and in its opening brief, appellant requests that 
the lower court judgment awarding compensation for "stripping rights" be reversed, and 
the Groesbecks instead be awarded compensation based on the investment value of the 
stock which they determined to be $3.50 per share, less $1.10 per share already paid, or a 
total of $88,322.40, plus interest. 
DATED this 30th day of August, 2004. / ^ \ ^ / O 
JOHN B. WILSON 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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